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STATEMENT OF JURISIDICTION

The Court of Appeals entered an Order of Affirmance on
June 13, 1989, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 31,
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.

From the foregoing Order,

the Plaintiff has filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with
the Supreme Court of Utah in accordance with the provisions of
Rules 42-48, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

A.

Whether the District Court and the Court of Appeals

correctly held that Defendant, Dr. Lonnie Paulos (Dr. Paulos),
owed no legal duty to Plaintiff, Dr. Jonathan Home (Plaintiff)
in connection with the examination which Dr. Paulos performed of
Plaintifffs former patient and in communicating the results of
his findings to the patient and the patient's attorney.
B.

Whether the District Court and the Court of Appeals

correctly held
"injurious

that Plaintiff's

falsehood"

claim against Dr. Paulos for

is governed

by the one-year statute of

limitations contained in Section 78-12-29, U.C.A.
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DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

The case was heard by the Court of Appeals in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 31, Rules of Utah Court of Appeals •
On June

13, 1989, the Court

Affirmance which upheld

of Appeals entered

an Order of

the Summary Judgment in favor of Dr.

Paulos.
CONTROLLING STATUTE

The statute of limitations

contained in Section

78-12-19, U.C.A., is controlling and provides as follows:
Within one year:
%**

(4) an action for libel, slander,
assault, battery, false imprisonment
or seduction. . . .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
This

claims

to

professional

is

have

an

action

sustained

negligence

for
as

on

a

the

damages
result
part

which
of

of

Plaintiff

the

Dr.

alleged

Paulos

in

examining Plaintiff's former patient and in the statements
which Dr. Paulos made
attorney.

The

to the patient and

Plaintiff

claims
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that

the patient's
the

alleged

professional

negligence

on

the

part

of

Dr.

Paulos

precipitated a medical malpractice lawsuit against him which
caused damage.

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
1.

DISPOSITION BY DISTRICT COURT

After

preliminary

discovery

was undertaken, Dr.

Paulos filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
Court

granted

Summary

Judgment

in

favor

The District
of

Dr. Paulos

holding as follows:
1.

Dr. Paulos owed no legal duty to the plaintiff

in connection with his examination of plaintifffs former
patient or the statements made to her attorney.
2.

Plaintifffs claim for "injurious falsehood11 is

a claim based upon libel and/or slander which is barred by
the one-year

statute of

limitations contained

in Section

78-12-29. U.C.A.

2.

DISPOSITION BY COURT OF APPEALS

The Court of Appeals, on its own motion, heard the
case in accordance with the provisions of Rule 31, Rules of
Utah Court of Appeals and entered an Order of Affirmance
which upheld the Summary Judgment in favor of Dr. Paulos.

-3-

C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
The

facts which

give rise

to

the

case

are in

summary as follows:
1.

June, 1982 —

Plaintiff provided medical care

to Teresa Ilene White (Ms. White) at Cottonwood Hospital for
injuries she sustained in an auto/pedestrian accident, which
injuries included a fracture of her right leg.

(See First

Amended Complaint, Para. 5 - 8, R. 7 -11; Amended Answer,
Para. 2 and 3, R. 18 - 23; Plaintiff's Responses, No. 1a.,
R. 95 -111.)
2.

Subsequent to the discharge of Ms. White from

the Hospital, she developed
right leg.

alignment deformities of her

Ms. White became displeased with the condition

of her leg and consulted Dr. Paulos.

(See First Amended

Complaint, Para. 9 and 10, R. 7 - 11; Amended Answer, Para.
15, R. 18 - 23; Plaintiff's Responses, No. 1a., R. 95 111 .)
3.

October

10, 1983 —

Dr. Paulos examined Ms.

White for the purpose of evaluating the condition of her
right leg.
11;

Amended

(See First Amended Complaint, Para. 10, R. 7 Answer,

Para.

5,

R.

18

-

23; Plaintiff's

Responses, No. 1a., No. 2a., R. 95 - 111.)
4.

Ms. White was contemplating bringing a medical

malpractice lawsuit against Plaintiff and had consulted with
an

attorney

to

represent

her

-4-

in

connection

with

this

claim.

Ms. White's attorney

requested

that Dr. Paulos

provide him with reports concerning her condition and the
cause of the same.

Dr. Paulos complied with this request

and the letters written by him upon which the claims are
based are as follows:
October 25, 1983 —

copy attached as Appendix C-1

December 6, 1983 —

copy attached as Appendix C-2

April 2, 1984 —

copy attached as Appendix C-3

(See Plaintiff's Response, No. 2a, R. 95 - 111).
5.

October 23, 1987 —

Plaintiff initiated legal

action against Dr. Paulos and has asserted the following
claims:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (NEGLIGENCE)
14. Defendant negligently evaulated the
professional services of plaintiff which
negligent evaluation was the actual and
proximate cause of harm suffered by
plaintiff.
SECOND
CAUSE
FALSEHOOD)

OF

ACTION

(INJURIOUS

17.
The statements made by defendant
relative to the alleged professional
negligence of plaintiff was false and
published to third persons.
(See First
Amended Complaint, Para. 1 3 - 1 8 , R. 7 11).

-5-

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
DR. PAULOS OWED NO LEGAL DOTY
TO THE PLAINTIFF
As indicated

in the

foregoing

Statement of

Facts, the Plaintiff claims that Dr. Paulos was guilty of
professional negligence in his evaluation of the condition
of

Plaintiff's

caused

former

Plaintiff

patient; and

damage

as

a

that this evaluation

result

of

the

medical

malpractice lawsuit which was filed against him.
As an elementary principle of tort law, maintenance
of a cause of action based upon negligence requires four
fundamental elements:
The elements of an action for negligence
include:
(1) a duty of reasonable care
owed by defendant to plaintiff; (2) a
breach of that duty; (3) causation, both
actual and proximate of the injury; and
(4) damages suffered by plaintiff.
Martin v, Mott, 744 P.2d 337, 388 (Utah App. 1987).

See,

also, Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985); Bach v.
University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986); and DCR, Inc.
v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983).
The

claims asserted

by Plaintiff have no legal

foundation and were reviewed and rejected by the court in
Kahn v. Burman, 673 F.Supp. 210 (E.D. Mich. 1987).

The

facts in Kahn are virtually identical to the facts in the
instant case in that a physician who was a defendant in a

medical

malpractice

plaintiff's

expert

action

brought

asserting

an

claims

action
of

against

negligence,

fraudulent and innocent misrepresentation, defamation, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The claims

were based upon the reports prepared by the expert and upon
his

deposition

testimony.

The

Court, adjudicating

the

negligence claim, held as follows:
This delineation of a witnesses1 duty
makes it apparent that Dr. Burman, as a
consultant and potential witness and
ultimately an expert witness, owed no
legal duty to Dr. Kahn, an adverse
litigant.
Utah

has

long

recognized

that

the

duty

of a

professional such as a physician or attorney runs to the
patient or client and not to third parties.

This principle

was set forth by the Supreme Court of Utah in the case of
Hughes v. Housley, 599 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1979).

In Hughes,

the client brought an action for legal malpractice against
his first attorney; the first attorney filed a Third-Party
Complaint against the second attorney.
affirmed

the dismissal

The Supreme Court

of the Third-Party

Complaint and

stated as follows:
A finding of negligence required the
presence of certain elements, one of
which is a duty running between the
parties. It is apparent from the facts
of this controversy that no duty ever
arose between the parties. Had Housley
[the first attorney] been Cotro-Manes1
[the second attorney] client, then CotroManes would have had a duty to Housley.

-7-

Cotro-Manes1 client, however, was Hughes
[the plaintiff]. It has long been held,
with few exceptions not applicable here,
that the obligation of an attorney is to
his client and not a third
party
(emphasis added).
Additionally, the Court in Kahn, supra, held that
the

expertfs

reports

were

relevant

to

the

judicial

proceedings and, therefore, subject to absolute protection
under the "Witness Immunity" doctrine:
Physicians' reports are so inextricably
interwined
with
medical
malpractice
actions that it would be illogical to
hold that such reports are not "relevant"
to the underlying judicial proceedings
[citations omitted].
To hold otherwise
would defeat the purpose of witness
immunity, which is to ensure that the
judicial process functions "unimpeded by
fear on the part of its participants that
they will be sued for damages for their
part in the proceedings."
[citation
omitted].
As a matter of policy, also, witness
immunity should be extended to repc ts
prepared by both potential and retained
expert witnesses. . . .
The cases cited by Plaintiff for the proposition
that

no

plaintiff

contractual
and

relationship

defendant

to

is

support

required
an

action

between a
based

on

negligence are inapplicable inasmuch as all of them involve
claim for physical injury to person or property.

(These

cases are contained on pages 5 and 6 of Plaintiff's Petition
and will not be re-cited here as they have no application).
Plaintiff

also

asserts

-8-

that

his

action

can be

maintained

based

upon

a

claim

of

"negligence

misrepresentation" which does not require privity between
the parties.
lacks

two

However, plaintiff's claim in the instant case

essential

elements

of

the

tort

of negligent

misrepresentation which have been established by the Supreme
Court of Utah as follows:
Where (1) one having a pecuniary interest
in a transaction, (2) is in a superior
position to know material facts, and (3)
carelessly or negligently make a false
representation
concerning
them,
(4)
expecting the other party to rely and act
thereon,
and
(5) the
other
party
reasonably does so, and C51 suffers loss
in that transaction, the representor can
be held responsible if the other elements
of fraud are also present.
Christensen v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d
302 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added).

As can be seen by the

Statement of Facts, the statements which Dr. Paulos made to
Ms. White and her attorney were not made with the intent
that Plaintiff would rely on the same nor does Plaintiff
claim that he relied on such statements.
The

thrust

of

Plaintiff's

claim

is

that

a

professional who is retained as an expert consultant and/or
witness

owes

a duty

to

the

party

whose

conduct

he is

reviewing to act in an nonnegligent manner and asks this
Court

to

create

malpractice".

a

new

tort

of

"expert

witness

Plaintiff cites no cases which support this

novel cause of action and indeed no such cases have been

found.

It is readily apparent that the creation of such a

cause of action would give rise to a never

ending cycle of

lawsuits wherein the prevailing party would sue the expert
consultants and/or witnesses retained by the opposing party
in all cases where expert opinions were expressed that a
professional

had committed

malpractice

in his particular

field*

As Judge Richard Davidson euphemistically pointed

out

the

at

time

of

oral

argument

before

the

Court of

Appeals, such a cause of action would create a substantial
"growth

industry"

for

the

legal

profession,

which

our

society simply could not endure.

POINT II.
PLAINTIFFfS CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
It is apparent from a review of Plaintiff1 s First
Amended
asserts

Complaint and
is

for

notwithstanding

his

Responses

libel

that the claim which he

and/or

slander

characterization

"injurious falsehood".

of

the

(defamation)
same

as an

Plaintiff bases his claim upon the

statements which Dr. Paulos made to Ms. White and upon the
letters which he wrote to her attorney.

The relevant dates

are, again, as follows:
October 10, 1983 —

examination.

October 25, 1983 —

letter to attorney.

December 6, 1983 —

letter to attorney.
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April 2, 1984 —

letter to attorney.

October 23, 1987 -- legal action filed.
Plaintiff attempts to avoid the effect of the
one-year statute of limitations by arguing that the claim is
based on an "injurious falsehood" rather than defamation and
that, consequently, the four year statute of limitations
contained in Section 78-12-25, U.C.A. is applicable.
In Direct Import Buyers1 Assoc, v. KSL, Inc., 538
P.2d

1040

(Utah

1975),

falsehood"

with

"slander

the

Court
of

equated

title"

"injurious

and

"product

disparagement" actions and noted:
The basis upon which plaintiff claims a
right to recover is libel and slander,
but
it
is
actually
for
injurious
falsehood. The principle of slander of
title, while similar, is not quite the
same, for in this case there is no
disparagement of plaintifffs title. It
is merely a deprication of the quality of
plaintiff's product.
538 P.2d at 1042, see also Jack B. Parson Companies vs.
Nield, 751 P.2d 1131 (Utah 1988).

The facts of this case

cannot support an action for "slander of title" or "product
disparagement".

The plaintiff's mislabeling of his claim

while imaginative does not change the true character of the
same and has no substantive legal effect.
Further, the great weight of authority is that even
if Plaintiff's action is characterized as one for injurious
falsehood,

it

is

still

governed

-11-

by

the

statute

of

limitations relating to defamation actions.

Plaintiff cites

Idaho norland Corp. v. Caelter Indus,, Inc., 509 F.Supp.
1070 (D. Colo. 1981) in support of his position that a claim
for injurious falsehood is not governed by the statute of
limitations applicable to actions for defamation.

However,

in Idano Norland, the Court recognized that a majority of
jurisdictions

apply

the

statute

of

limitations

defamation to true claims for injurious falsehood.

for

There is

no logical reason to have a different statute of limitations
applicable to claims for defamation and claims for injurious
falsehood, and in recognizing this, the Oregon Supreme Court
succinctly concluded:
We can see no substantial reason why the
legislature would make any distinction
between an action involving defamation of
title to property and one based upon
defamation of the person. A study of the
historical development of the statute of
limitations in this state confirms us in
the view that the limitation as to the
commencement of action for libel and
slander is the same whether the slander
involves property or the person.
Woodward v. Pacific Fruit Produce Co., 106 P.2d 1043, 1046
(Or. 1940).
The

Plaintiff's

action,

whether

it

be

deemed

"defamation" or "injurious falsehood" is subject to the oneyear statute of limitations and is untimely.

-12-

CONCLUSION
The

District

Court

and

the

Court

of

Appeals

correctly held that Dr. Paulos owed no legal duty to the
Plaintiff and that his action based upon "negligence" cannot
be maintained.
have relied

Further, Plaintiff did not and could not

upon the statements made by Dr. Paulos and,

thus, no cause of action for "negligent misrepresentation"
arose.
Plaintiff's

claim

for

"injurious

falsehood"

is

factually and legally one for libel and/or slander and the
District Court and Court of Appeals correctly held that it
was subject to the one-year statute of limitations.
The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be
denied.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

M*

day of August,

1989
IPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

J.\ ANTHONY EYRE
ittorneys for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

//

day of August,

1989, 4 true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief in
Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, were mailed
to the following:

James E. Morton
Ronald C. Wolthuis
HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

bJJtdLjj,
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APPENDIX
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Tab A

r- s L E D
JUN134889
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

VJiah. Court e i A&?6<rff

OOOOO

Dr. Jonathan Home,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

v.

Case No. 880461-CA

Dr. Lonnie E. Paulos,
Defendant and Respondent.

Before Judges Garff, Davidson and Croft (Retired District Judge
Sitting by Special Assignment) (On Rule 31 Hearing).
The summary judgment of the district court is affirmed.
.^-

5ATED~lhiis 1 3 t h day o f ..June,
••OR THE COURT:

-iv-

1989.

TabB

J UN 15 1938

J. ANTHONY EYRE (#1022)
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Attorney for Defendant
City Centre I, #330
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3773
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DR. JONATHAN HORNE,

:

Plaintiff,

:

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF DR. LONNIE E. PAULOS

vs.

:

DR. LONNIE E. PAULOS,

:

Civil No. C87-6961

:

Judge Leonard H. Russon

Defendant.
The
Dr.

Lonnie

Motion

E. Paulos

for

Summary

came

on

Judgment

of

Defendant

for hearing before Judge

Leonard H. Russon on May 23, 1988; plaintiff, Dr. Jonathan
Home (Dr. H o m e ) , being represented by his attorney, James
E. Moreton; defendant, Dr. Lonnie E. Paulos (Dr. Paulos),
being represented

by his

attorney, J. Anthony

Eyre; the

Court having considered the record of the case, including
the Memoranda of the parties, having heard the arguments
of

counsel

and having

concluded

that Dr. Paulos had

no

legal duty to the plaintiff, Dr. Home, with respect to

-v-

the evaluation by Dr. Paulos of the medical services provided
by Dr. H o m e to Teresa Ilene White and thus the claim for
negligence cannot be legally
concluded

that

falsehood11

is

the

made; the Court having further

plaintiff's

a claim

based upon

claim
liable

for

"injurious

and/or slander

and the statements giving rise to the claim were published
more

than

one

year

prior

to

the

time

the

action

was

commenced;
Now therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion
for Summary

Judgment of defendant, Dr. Lonnie E. Paulos,

is

and

granted

the

Amended

Complaint

of the plaintiff,

Dr. Jonathan Home, against defendant, Dr. Lonnie E. Paulos,
is dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this

/V

day of June, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

LEONARD H. RUSSON
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
MAILED, postage

prepaid, this

fr^h

day of

June, 1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Summary
Judgment in Favor of Dr. Lonnie E. Paulos, to the following:
James E. Morton
HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

yj^ffr
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TabC

r)

hn-.'u«.N D HuMinlnMg. M . D .

October 25, 1983

Mr. Roger Sharp
Suite 1030
185 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
RE: Teresa Ilene White
Dear Mr. Sharp:
Cn October 10, 1983 I saw Teresa Ilene White in the office for evaluation and second
opinion. Teresa is a 16 year old white female who was involved in a serious autopedestrian accident in June, 1982. At that tine she apparently suffered multiple
injuries including a fracture-dislocation of her mandible, ccnminuted, both bone
fracture of the right lower leg as well as a transverse both bene fracture of the
left lower leg. Apparently the patient was taken to the Cottonwood Hospital Bnergency
Roan where she was treated and referred to Dr. H o m e for definitive treatment of her
tibial fractures. Because the left fracture was open the patient was taken ijnrediately
to surgery. The left tibia was debrided, irrigated and an cpen reduction internal
fixation with hardware used at that time. Apparently conccmitant work was being done
by Dr. Walker cn facial lacerations and her mandibular fracture. At that time
Dr. Home did a closed manipulation of the fracture of the right tibia and a postoperative knee splint was applied. It was felt by Dr. H o m e that a snug postoperative
cast could not be used because of the severe swelling present. Also because of the *
multiple other injuries he elected closed reduction of this leg rather than cpen ancj
felt as though he could hold the reduction through casting.
In reviewing postoperative x-ray readings by the Radiology Department at the Cbttonwcod
Hospital, the closed reducticn of the right tibia was successful and according to
x-rays on June 29, 1982 axial alignment of that fracture with cortical apposition
was present. The patient was subsequently discharged, to be followed by both Dr. Home
and Dr. Walker as an outpatient.
Between the patientfs discharge and the end of July, 1982, the patient questioned the
orthopedic care she was receiving and transferred the care of Teresa to Dr. Reed Fogg.
Available to me were office notes from Dr. Fogg's chart. The first note being dated
July 22, 1982. According to his notes Teresa had been placed in a long leg cast cn
the right following the closed reduction and immediately around the hospital discharge
time. By August 31, 1982 Dr. Poggfs notes relate that the left leg has "corplete ;
healing". The right tibia which had been previously plated was also showing "good
healing". The last note in Dr. Fogg's chart, dated March 1, 1983, states that Teresa
is doing extremely well and walking almost without a limp. He felt as though further
therapy was necessary and she was to return to see him in six weeks.

APPENDIX CI
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3ince that time, according to Teresa's history, she has developed right knee problens
/ith giving away episodes, recurrent pain and swelling in the knee and aching pain along
:he anterior medial tibia an the right. She feels as though her left tibia is
essentially asymptomatic and her main problems new are her mandible and right lower leg.
She also oanplains of the leg being "crooked" and that it "hyperextends" and "pops".
the feels as though she has had to learn to walk in a different way and is displeased,
/ith the result thus far.
Physical examination demonstrates the patient to walk with a slightly antalgic gait
:o the right leg. No swelling is noted in the right knee. A recurvatum position as
:onpared to the left knee is noted as well as an increased varus position* Crepitation
Ls noted in the right subpatellar area slightly more than the left. Patellofemoral
alignment, per se, is normal and nonral laxity is present. There was no ligamentous
Instability noted in the knee or meniscal findings. There was a slight leg length
ilscrepancy, left shorter than right, perhaps one-half inch* Muscle atrophy in both
Lower extremities consistent with the severity of the injury ard subsequent treatment
*as noted.
<-rays obtained of the right proximal tibia demonstrated 8 degrees of recurvatum and
L5 degrees of varus secondary to the previous fracture and healing.
rt is my opinion that the present position of the right tibia will lead to progressive
eight knee problems secondary to malposition. Although the amount of recurvatum
present by itself could possibly be tolerated the 15 degrees of varus will not be.
""his type of positioning will lead to progressive deterioration and arthritis of the
jiee and should be surgically corrected sometime in the near future. I believe the
present knee symptoms which Teresa White is suffering from are not only seoondary to
the significant trauma which she sustained in the auto-pedestrian accident and subsequent
Tiuscle atrophy but also secondary to the malposition of the tibial fracture fragments
and serve as an early warning that surgical correction should be entertained in the
:iear future.
rJhile in the office, the patient's mother raised the issue of medical malpractice seoondary
to the right tibia positicn. As I explained to the patient and her mother medical
nalpractice is a legal issue which needs to be decided in a court of law. I can only
state at this time that in my opinion, the present tibial position is not consistent
with acceptable community standards. I, however, would encourage you to obtain several
[tore opinions in that the treatment of tibial fractures is difficult at best and the
surrounding issue of rredical malpractice concerning tibial fractures should involve
more than one or twoi opinions.
//

/

Should you have any/fuijicher need for information please feel free to contact me.
Sincerely,

Ionnie E. Pa

\j
TEP/ml
closure
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honias D. Rosenberg, M.D.

Lonnie E. Paulos ; M.D.
December 6, 1983

Mr. Roger T. Sharp
Suite 1030
185. South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
:

EE:~-Supplemental Information Reoardincr
Teresa White ,

Dear Mr." Sharo:
•m response to your letter Nbveriber 16th I am su^lyiixj tik: following iniformaticn.'
Thetype of surgery.\Mch'I have suggested to'Miss White"is.'a corrective osteotomy
*pf-the.tibia. This would require-appradTO
siicgery- with a hardware fixation * M c h then would subsequently* have'to be .removed
pn.:aV:seoandary surgery approximately a year to: two y e ^ ..later.; Ccnc^rning the
questaJm.as'the issue of future quality of realignmsnt I '.am sorry•--that'• I" cannot
iespor^ . ^
I am not quite sure vihat you mean* • Certainly .the knee can be
realigned so as to minimize further problems- As to the'extentof /damage that has
occurred in the knee joint itself secondary to the malalignment cannot be assessed
by physical examination alcne. It is my feeling that in view of the short period
oft time between her accident and the time of this evaluation that .the permanent
damage "to the knee is very slight.
The estimate of surgical costs would be in the neighborhood of. $5,000 for the first
surgery and perhaps $2,000 for the second surgery.
In.tespcnse to theseccnd paragraph of your letter I just-wish to 'state that* I' feel
Miss White's present alignment of her limb is unacceptable."v I have explained to them
that a realignment is necessary to preserve the prefer .functioning of the ankle and
knee articulations in that extremity.
... v : .
Should vou need any further informaticn please feel free to contact me..
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T h o m a s D . R o s e n b e r g , M.D.

L o n n i e E. P a u l o s , M.D.
April 2, 1984

Roger T. Sharp
Attorney at Law
Suite 1030
185 South State St.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
HE: Teresa White

Dear Mr, Sharp:
I apologize for the delay in returning my response to you but have been rather busy
of late.
In specific response to ycur questions labelled a through h I am responding •
Question a. Was the medical management of Ms* White by her original treating
physician acceptable for a specialist in orthopedic surgery?
I feel that the majority of her treatment was certainly acceptable and within the
guidelines established in this medical coimunity. She was left, however, with a
permanent deformity of her right tibia which by these iredical connunity standards
as well as cannon orthopedic textbcok standards is unacceptable,
Question b. What specific deviations in acceptable medical care do you believe occurred
regarding this young girl?
I believe the acceptance of a malunion beyond those limits normally accepted by orthopedic
surgeons for her right tibia fracture is, a deviation"frcra normal. I wish to stress to
you hcwever the need for one or two other opinions in this regard. As I mentioned to
you en the telephone the treatment of tibial fractures is very difficult and many
times requires the acceptance of less than perfect reduction. I believe that the amount
of accepted deformity in Teresa White's right tibia is excessive but do feel several
other opinions should be obtained to confirm my own.
Question c. What is the current physical condition of Ms. White's lower extremities.
I refer you to my letter of October 25, 1983 because I believe it answers this specif ical:
Question d. What curative or remedial actions do you propose in an effort to correct
Ms. White's current misalignment in her lower extremities?
I wish to correct that in that misalignment only occurs in the right extrenity and not
the left. I would propose that she will require a corrective osteotomy of the tibia
with hardware fixation followed by a second procedure to remove the hardware. Probably
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autogenous bone grafting will be required at this same setting.
Question e. What is the estimated cost for all hospital and medical expenses
this future corrective surgery?

for

I am only guessing, but I suspect that we will be talking in the neighborhood of
$10,000.
Question f. When do you reconnend surgery for Mrs. White in the future?
As soon as possible.
Question g. Please estimate the type and degree of corrective alignment you expect
in future surgery for Ms. White.
Obviously we expect to achieve normal alignment but what can be obtained will be
dependent upon the conditions at surgery. Our plan will be to correct the large
amount of varus and recurvatum which she presently has meaning a biplanar osteotomy,
Biplanar osteotaides are difficult to perform and to control so the final obtained
alignment will be dependent on the surgical outcome.
Question h. Based upon reasonable medical judgement what will be the extent of any
residual problems for Ms. White because of her original inappropriate care?
At this time it is difficult to eminent on this question. She has had intermittent
knee problems and it is possible that an arthroscopic evaluation at the time of her
tibia realignment will help assess any knee damage. Obviously knee damage can cone
from the severity of her previous accident as well as from the malalignment which is
present in the tibia. I honestly believe that a majority of Ms. White's problems
are probably a result of her original injury rather than mistreatment. The need for
osteotomy and corrective surgery is to prevent jf^refeher problens in the future.
Should you need^opy further information please feel free to contact me.
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